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ARTICLE 
LLOYD V. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION: AN 
UNFORTUNATE DETOUR IN MARYLAND PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY LAW 
By: Rebecca Korzec" 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In products liability cases, the injured plaintiff must demonstrate 
the necessary causal connection between the defective product and the 
plaintiffs injuries. l Nevertheless, in some limited cases, plaintiffs 
allege an increased risk of harm for the future, rather than any actual 
present, injury.2 Often these cases involve asbestos and prescription 
drugs.3 
Of particular interest are cases in which the plaintiff claims "purely 
economic 10ss.,,4 Pure economic loss damages are "damages for 
inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective 
product, or consequent loss of profits - without any claim of personal 
injury or damage to other property."s The justification for the 
economic loss doctrine is that the plaintiff who has received 
"insufficient product value,,6 should sue in contract/ rather than tort.8 
2 
4 
Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108, 132-33, 916 A.2d 257, 271 (2007) 
(hereinafter "Lloyd") (citing Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 341, 
363 A.2d 955,957 (1976». 
See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent 
Diseases Resulting/rom Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REv. 613 (2005). 
[d. at 653-54. 
See, e.g., Progressive Ins. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 749 N.E.2d 484, 488 (Ind. 
2001) ("[E]conomic damages [are defined] under Indiana Law as the diminution 
in the value of a product and consequent loss of profits because the product is 
inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it was 
manufactured and sold."). 
Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 
917,918 (1966). 
Oceanside at Pine Point Condo. Owners Ass'n. v. Peachtree Doors, Inc., 659 
A.2d 267, 270 (Me. 1995). 
See, e.g., Reed v. Cent. Soya Co., 621 N.E.2d 1069, 1074-75 (Ind. 1993). 
See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149 (Cal. 1965); see also, 
Alloway v. Gen. Marine Indus., 695 A.2d 264,270-71 (N.J. 1997) (reviewing 
majority cases). 
127 
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In Lloyd v. General Motors Corp., the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
rejected the majority rule in American products liability law by 
holding that unmanifested product defects, defects that have not 
caused personal injury, can still be actionable.9 The court reinstated a 
class action brought by plaintiff buyers against automobile 
manufacturers who sold cars alleged to contain defective seatbacks. lo 
The seatbacks had yet to cause any actual injuries to the plaintiff class 
members, as the alleged defects had not even manifested themselves. II 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reasoned that, since 
the alleged defects could potentially cause serious injury or death, the 
cost of repairing the seatbacks was actionable in consumer protection, 
in contract, and in tort. 12 
In this article, I argue that Lloyd is an unfortunate, unwarranted, 
and unnecessary extension of tort law. Assuming arguendo that the 
seatbacks were defective, plaintiffs had adequate remedies in 
consumer protection and contract. 13 By recognizing a products 
liability tort remedy in this situation, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland is in conflict with Maryland precedent,14 with the majority 
of American jurisdictions, I 5 and with the underlying goals and 
rationales of products liability law. As such, Lloyd is a departure in 
both theory and practice. 
II. THE CASE 
The Lloyd plaintiffs brought suit against General Motors, Ford 
Motors, Daimler Chrysler, and Saturn, alleging that the front seats of 
cars they had purchased would collapse backwards in rear-impact 
collisions. 16 Plaintiffs alleged that these seat defects could potentially 
cause serious injury or death.17 Although the seatbacks had yet to fail, 
the plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves and other Maryland 
9 397 Md. 108,916 A.2d 257 (2007). 
10 Id. at 171,916 A.2d at 294. 
II Id. at 117-18, 916 A.2d at 262. 
12 Id. at 171, 916 A.2d at 293-94. 
13 See id. at 157, 916 A.2d at 285-86. The court itself recognizes these claims 
under the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. Lloyd, 397 Md. at 140-43, 916 
A.2d 276-78. 
14 See infra section IV. 
15 See infra section III. 
16 Lloyd, 397 Md. at 117-18,916 A.2d at 262. 
17 Id. at 118,916 A.2d at 262. 
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resident purchasers of the cars, seeking damages for the cost of 
repairing or replacing the seatbacks.!8 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland admitted that a plaintiff in a 
products liability case generally may not recover for pure economic 
damages.!9 Nevertheless, the court recognized an exception to the 
economic damage rule when the product defect creates a "substantial 
and unreasonable risk of death or personal injury.,,2o The court found 
that Lloyd fit within the stated exception, given the nature of the 
potential damage and the probability of its occurrence?! Significantly, 
the court stated, "it is exactly the risk of serious bodily injury involved 
in this case that the exception to the economic loss rule was intended 
to remedy, to 'encourafe people to correct dangerous conditions 
before tragedy results. ,,,2 
The Lloyd opinion is clearly a minority view.23 Most American 
courts require plaintiffs in a products liability claim to allege a present 
injury.24 For example, the Eighth Circuit has observed that, 
"purchasers of an allegedly defective product have no legally 
recognizable claim where the alleged defect has not manifested itself 
in the product they own." 25 "An overwhelming majority of courts 
have dismissed these unrnanifested defect claims and rejected the idea 
that [plaintiffs] can sue manufacturers for speculative damage.,,26 
A major problem with the Lloyd analysis is that it gives a tort 
remedy for a contract claim.27 Basically, the only injury to the 
plaintiffs is that they may not have received the benefit of their bargain 
18 Id. at 117-18, 916 A.2d at 262 ("None of the petitioners or any putative class 
members allege . . . personal injury as a result of the mechanical failure that 
caused the aIleged defect. Indeed, persons with such experiences were 
expressly excluded from this class.") /d. at 118,916 A.2d at 262. 
19 /d. at 123,916 A.2d at 265-66. 
20 Id. at 123, 916 A.2d at 266 (quoting U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of BaIt., 336 
Md. 145, 156-57,647 A.2d405, 410 (1994». 
21 Id. at 130,916 A.2d at 270. 
22 /d. at 131,916 A.2d at 270 (quoting Morris v. Osmose, 340 Md. 519, 534-35, 
667 A.2d 624, 632 (1995)). 
23 See id. at 123,916 A.2d at 266; see also DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
LAW 272 & n.82 (West 2005). Ohio and Florida are also in the minority. See 
LaPuma v. Collinwood Concrete, 661 N.E.2d 714 (Ohio 1996); Collins v. 
Daimler Chrysler Corp., 894 So. 2d 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
24 See, e.g., Briehl v. Gen. Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 628 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(citations omitted). 
25 Id. 
26 /d. at 630. 
27 Lloyd, 397 Md. at 123,916 A.2d at 265. 
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if they did not receive the car seats for which they paid?8 However, 
"benefit of the bargain" is the essence of a contract claim. 29 To 
maintain a products liability claim, plaintiffs must prove that they 
were injured by a product defect that was unreasonably dangerous to 
the ultimate product user. 30 
Lloyd seems willing to recognize an exception for buyers who are 
merely disappointed in a contractual sense.31 The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland considered the plaintiffs in Lloyd to be in danger of 
suffering potential harm which required immediate tort 
compensation. 32 Therefore, Maryland becomes one of the few states 
to permit an exception to the economic loss doctrine based on 
distinguishing the disap~ointed product buyer from the potentially 
endangered product user. 3 
III. THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
The widely-accepted eC0nomic loss doctrine generally prohibits 
recovery in tort for purely economic losses which arise independent 
from damage to persons or property.34 The rule is so generally 
accepted that comprehensive products liability reform efforts usually 
exclude recovery for economic loss and property damage.35 
Moreover, section 21 of the Products Liability Restatement permits 
recovery for economic loss only "if caused by harm to: (a) the 
28 Id. at 149,916 A.2d at 281. 
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1979). 
30 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also Phipps v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). 
31 See Lloyd, 397 Md. at 131,916 A.2d at 270. 
32 See id. at 134,916 A.2d at 272. 
33 Other states that adopted the minority view are Alaska, Georgia, and Iowa. See 
N. Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 329 (Alaska 
1981); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 306 S.E.2d 253,257 (Ga. 1983); 
Am. Fire and Cas. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 588 N.W.2d 437,438 (Iowa 1999). 
34 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. 
OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9A, 681 (5th ed. 1984) 
(noting that parties who have bargained should not be permitted to circumvent 
their bargain after loss occurs to the property that was the subject of their 
bargain); see generally David Gruning, Pure Economic Loss in American Tort 
Law: An Unstable Consensus, 54 AM. 1. COMPo L. (SUPPLEMENT) 187 (2006); J. 
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, U.C.C. § 10-5 (5th ed. 2000) (generally endorsing the 
idea that pure economic losses should not be recovered in tort). 
35 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-687 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m 
(2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-l (West 2000); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 
2307.71 (LexisNexis 2006). 
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plaintiff's person; or (b) the person of another ... or (c) the plaintiff's 
property other than the defective product itself.,,36 
The controlling law in this area is an admiralty case decided by the 
United States Supreme Court: East River Steamship Corp. v. 
Transamerica Delaval, Inc. 37 East River is a strict liability and 
negligence case brought by the charterers of four ships against the 
manufacturer of turbines installed in those ships.38 Plaintiffs alleged 
that the turbines were defectively designed, causing damage to the 
turbines themselves.39 Plaintiffs sought damages for the cost of 
repairing the turbines, as well as lost income while the ships were not 
in service.4o Applying products liability concepts, the Court 
unanimously held "that a manufacturer in a commercial relationship 
has no duty under either a negligence or strict products liability theory 
to prevent a product from injuring itself.,,41 
The Court considered three approaches for determining whether an 
action can be brought in tort for damage only to the product itself. 
Significantly, the Court rejected the intermediate view, noting that a 
distinction which rests on the manner in which the product is damaged 
is not persuasive.42 Whether the product itself is damaged by gradual 
deterioration, internal breakage, or by a calamitous event should not be 
dispositive.43 By definition, no other property or person is damaged.44 
Economic loss resulting from a calamitous event simply means that 
the buyer failed to receive the benefit of the bargain, a matter 
traditionally within the province of contract law, rather than tort law.45 
Moreover, the Court rejected the minority approach for failing to 
maintain contract and tort law in separate spheres.46 Such separation 
results in more appropriate, realistic damages.47 In adopting the 
majority approach to pure economic loss, the Court stressed a number 
of doctrinal concepts. 
36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 (1998). 
37 476 U.S. 858 (1986) (holding that admiralty law incorporates principles of 
products liability law.) 
38 /d. at 861. 
39 /d. 
40 /d. 
41 Id. at 871. 
42 Id. at 870. 
43 E. River Steamship Corp. (hereinafter "E. River"), 476 U.S. at 870. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. at 87l. 
47 See id. at 872. 
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First, appropriate tort safety concerns are minimized where the 
defective product damages only itself. Therefore, a defective product 
that does not damage any person or other property simply fails to meet 
the burer's reasonable expectations, which constitutes a warranty 
claim.4 In the main, warranty doctrine is suited to commercial 
disputes not involving significant disparities in bargaining power.49 
Warranty law has inherent limitations on liability, while tort law 
recognizes a duty to the general public, permitting recovery for 
foreseeable losses. 50 As a result, tort recovery could subject product 
manufacturers to indefinite economic losses to a buyer's customers.51 
Therefore, warranty law provides a bright line for damages to the 
product itself, avoiding the needless uncertainty inherent in any 
attempt to limit pure economic losses in negligence and strict liability. 
Clearly, the United States Supreme Court recognized the differing 
legitimate interests protected by contract law as opposed to tort law. 
Contractual liability stems from society's interest in performing 
promises so that contracting parties' reasonable expectations are 
protected. 52 By contrast, tort doctrine protects the product user's 
interest in being free from product harm, regardless of the existence of 
a contract between the ultimate user and the product manufacturer or 
seller.53 Products liability law recognizes that users and sellers of 
products, especially consumer products, enjoy unequal bargaining 
positions. 54 As a result, the law must provide protection to the public 
from unsafe products.55 Products liability tort law places 
responsibility on the manufacturers of defective products because they 
are in the best position to design, manufacture, and market safe 
products, as well as to allocate losses for injuries resulting from unsafe 
products.56 On the other hand, repair costs are based on the buyer's 
loss of the benefit of the contractual bargain -- a loss which should be 
48 Id. at 871-72. 
49 E. River, 476 U.S. at 872-73. 
50 /d. at 874. 
51 /d. at 872 ("[T]he increased cost to the public that would result from holding a 
manufacturer liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not justified."). Id. 
52 See id. at 872-74. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 E. River, 476 U.S. at 872-74. 
56 Id. at 871. 
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compensated in contract rather than tort.57 In East River, the Court 
explained the doctrines as follows: "Damage to a product itself is 
most naturally understood as a warranty claim. Such damage means 
simply that the product has not met the customer's expectations, or, in 
other words, that the customer has received 'insufficient product 
value. ",58 
Some courts have found an exception for actions against 
manufacturers of asbestos products, permitting tort claims for the costs 
of removing asbestos insulation.59 Asbestos' characteristic flexibility, 
strength, and heat resistance led to its use in insulation and related 
products until the 1970s.6o Its pervasive use led to millions of 
individuals' exposure to asbestos dUSt.61 Inhalation of asbestos causes 
major diseases, including lung cancer, mesothelioma and asbestosis.62 
The asbestos cases present a situation in which the very exposure to 
the product causes physical harm, although the extent of the harm may 
not become apparent for decades.63 Maryland asbestos cases have 
required the plaintiff to suffer "functional impairment" to maintain a 
strict liability action.64 Such "functional impairment" requires the 
plaintiff to experience symptoms, such as shortness of breath, which 
curtail normal activities.65 The rationale in these cases is that the 
57 /d. at 872; see also V.C.c. § 2-313 (2004) (express warranty); V.C.C. § 2-314 
(2004) (implied warranty of merchantability); V.C.C. § 2-315 (2004) (implied 
warranty of fitness for particular purpose). 
58 E. River, 476 V.S. at 872. 
59 See, e.g., Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15 v. V.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915,919-
20 (8th Cir. 1993); 80 South Eighth St. Ltd. P'ship v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 486 
N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1992). The Restatement (Third) of Torts, section 21 
comment e, provides that: "One category of claims stands apart. In the case of 
asbestos contamination in buildings, most courts have taken the position that the 
contamination constitutes harm to the building as other property. The serious 
health threat caused by asbestos contamination has led the courts to this 
conclusion. Thus, actions seeking recovery for the costs of asbestos removal 
have been held to be within the purview of products liability law rather than 
commercial law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e 
(1998). 
60 See, e.g., Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
61 /d. at 323-24. 
62 /d. at 324. 
63 See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 
1973). 
64 See generally Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 121-22, 604 
A.2d 47,54 (1992). 
65 Cf ACandS v. Abate, 121 Md. App. 590, 693, 710 A.2d 944, 995 (1998) 
(discussing shortness of breath related to asbestos related injuries). 
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property owners were not suing for the contractual benefit of their 
bargain. Instead, the property owners were seeking to recover the cost 
of removing asbestos since asbestos exposure itself risks the health of 
those exposed to it. 66 As a result, these courts conclude that the 
economic loss doctrine should not bar tort recovery in such limited 
circumstances.67 
Courts justify recovery for damage to property other than the 
product itself.68 The prevailing view permits recovery for such 
damage in both warranty and in tort.69 For example, the United States 
Supreme Court held that the owner of a fishing vessel could recover 
damages for the loss of equipment added by the previous owner of the 
vessel after purchase from the manufacturer.7o In that case, the vessel 
caught fire and sank, causing the owner to bring a products liability 
action against the manufacturer of the vessel and arainst the designer 
of the hydraulic system, alleging defective design.7 The Court found 
that the added equipment constituted "other property" rather than harm 
to the "product itself."n 
Maryland law is in accord with these general principles. For 
example, in a case decided before the Saratoga Fishing Co. opinion, 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland permitted recovery for the loss of 
140,000 chickens that died as a result of a power outage that caused 
the ventilation system in the chicken house to shut down.73 The 
defendant's transfer switch caused the power outage, by failing to 
activate the backup power supply.74 
66 See generally Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for Asbestos Removal Costs, 
73 OR. L. REv. 505 (1994). The Restatement adopts the East River approach, 
but recognizes that products that are dangerous to users are generally governed 
by products liability tort rules rather than contract. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: PROD. LIAS. § 21 cmt. d (1998). 
67 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAS. § 21 cmt. d. 
68 [d. § 21 cmt. e. 
69 [d.; see also U.C.C. § 2-715 (2003). 
70 Saratoga Fishing Co. v. I.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 877 (1997). 
71 [d. at 877. 
72 !d. 
73 A.1. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 634 A.2d 1330 
(1994). As a result, the "other property requirement" was met in that the 
chickens were lost, causing the plaintiff economic loss to property other than the 
defective equipment. Simply put, the defective product caused the plaintiff to 
lose more than his contractual bargain -- it also harmed other property. 
74 [d. at 247, 634 A.2d at 1331. 
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Thus, the significant question is the definition of "other property." 
For example, in a 2005 Indiana case, Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 
homeowners brought a negligence claim against a masonry contractor 
who installed a stone fa~ade on their home, seeking to recover 
damages for repair costs and lost use of the home due to severe 
moisture damage.75 The court permitted tort recovery on the theory 
that the homeowner had purchased the masonry fa~ade, not the 
house.76 As a result, tort recovery for damage to the home was not 
limited by the economic loss doctrine. 77 
Moreover, most courts disagree with the Lloyd court's conclusion 
that a mere possibility that a product defect may cause physical harm 
is sufficient justification for abrogating the economic loss rule.78 
Rejecting the economic loss doctrine completely ignores the basic 
principle that injury must occur before a tort action may be brought.79 
If an injury has not occurred, causation and victim identity remain 
completely speculative. As a result, potential manufacturer liability is 
indeterminate, with no possibility that damages will be reasonably 
related to risk, and with no possibility that the product manufacturer 
can plan to protect against that risk. 80 
As previously discussed, in East River and Saratoga Fishing Co., 
the United States Supreme Court embraced the economic loss rule, 
making it more difficult for parties to move from contract to tort in 
products liability cases. 81 Simply put, the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized, along with the majority of courts and the 
Products Liability Restatement, that pure economic loss to the product 
itself should be governed by contract law.82 
75 822 N.E.2d 150,151 (Ind. 2005). 
76 Id. at 156. 
77 Id. at 156-57. 
78 See, e.g., Casa Clara Condo. Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 
1244 (Fla. 1993). 
79 Id; see a/so Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 
HARV. L. REv. 961, 1101 (2001) (noting reluctance to impose liability on 
fairness grounds when it cannot be proved that injurer caused harm to victim). 
80 E. River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica De/ava/, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 874 
(1986). 
81 See supra section III. 
82 "[T]ort law is a superfluous and inapt tool for resolving purely commercial 
disputes. We have a body of law designed for such disputes. It is called 
contract law. Products liability law has evolved into a specialized branch of tort 
law for use in cases in which a defective product caused, not the usual 
commercial loss, but a personal injury to a consumer or bystander." Miller v. 
U.S. Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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Tort and contract law treat damages for defective goods which have 
not yet caused physical injury differently. Physical injury is not 
required for warranty damage recovery - economic damages for 
disappointment in the product's performance are sufficient. 83 
However, physical harm is required for recovery of tort damages.84 
Ignoring the difference between tort and contract theory creates 
confusion and hinders the development of coherent policy. 
Lloyd seems inconsistent with previous Maryland case law. In 
addition, this view is supported by the Fourth Circuit's interpretations 
of Maryland law. For example, in Hagepanos v. Shiley, Inc.,85 the 
plaintiff received a heart valve implant in 1982, a date when the 
manufacturer stated the failure rate to be one in ten thousand. 86 Six 
years later, the failure rate estimates became between one in one 
hundred and one in ten.87 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower 
court's dismissal, because to recover "future damages" in Maryland, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the occurrence of the damages is more 
probable than not, meaning more than fifty of one hundred valves 
would fail. 88 Significantly, the Fourth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs 
argument that he should recover "present" damages for his "present 
fear.,,89 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit stated that recovery for 
"present fear" would frustrate Ma~land law since many plaintiffs 
could claim distress about the future. 0 
IV. MARYLAND ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE 
Maryland law specifically requires that, "compensatory damages 
are not to be awarded in negligence or strict liability actions absent 
83 u.C.C. § 2-714(2) (2004) ("The measure of damages for breach of warranty is 
the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the 
goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted 
.... "). 
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) ("Physical harm thereby 
caused .... "); see also id. § 402A cmt. c. 
85 No. 87-314, 1988 WL 35752 (4th Cir. Apr. 18, 1988) (unpublished table 
decision). 
86 /d. at *1. 
87 /d. 
88 Id. (citing Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 666, 464 A.2d 
1020, 1026 (1983); Davidson v. Miller, 276 Md. 54, 62, 344 A.2d 422,427-28 
(1975». 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
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evidence that the plaintiff suffered a loss or detriment.,,91 Generally, 
Maryland does not permit recovery in tort for pure economic loss 
resulting from a product defect unless that defect causes a condition 
which creates a significant risk of death or personal injury.92 To 
circumvent this rule, thereby allowing recovery in tort for pure 
economic losses, Maryland cases consider both the nature of the 
threatened damage and the probability that the damage will OCCUr.93 
Ultimately, Maryland cases permit recovery for pure economic loss in 
tort only when the defective product exhibits clear, serious, and 
unreasonable risk of death or personal injury.94 
As a result, if the potential injury is extremely severe, such as the 
occurrence of multiple deaths, the probability of injury is not required 
to be as significant as when the potential injury is less dangerous.95 
Absent such a significantly dangerous condition, a buyer is limited to 
contractual recovery, including recovery for breach of express and 
implied warranties.96 Generally, contractual remedies offer more 
limited damages than tort money damages.97 In an appropriate tort 
case, punitive damages are also available.98 
91 Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong, 87 Md. App. 699, 735, 591 A.2d 544, 561 (1991). 
92 See, e.g., Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 536, 667 A.2d 624, 
633 (1995) (holding that because plaintiff homeowners failed to prove that 
defects in plywood used to construct roofs on their homes caused any injury or 
created a serious, unreasonable risk of death or personal injury, the plaintiffs 
were barred from recovery in tort by economic loss doctrine). 
93 See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
94 See, e.g., A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 251, 634 
A.2d 1330, 1332 (1994); Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condo., Inc. v. 
Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 40-41, 517 A.2d 336, 348 (1986). 
9S See supra note 65. 
96 See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Mayor of Bait., 336 Md. 145, 156,647 A.2d 405, 
410 (1994); A.J. Decoster Co., 333 Md. at 250, 634 A.2d at 1332. 
97 Tort damages may include punitive damages and recovery of attorneys fees 
generally not recoverable in contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 
(1978); see, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND 
COMPENSATION 759 (West 1997). 
98 ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 344 Md. 155, 186, 686 A.2d 250, 265 (1996); Owens 
Coming v. Bauman, 125 Md. App. 454, 532-33, 726 A.2d 745, 784 (1999) 
(holding that a plaintiff must prove two elements: actual knowledge of the 
defect and deliberate disregard of the consequences of the defect). 
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V. HIDDEN AGENDAS 
A. The Punitive Damages Threat 
Punitive damages may be the hidden agenda or threat lurking in 
Lloyd. Generally, such damages are unavailable in contract actions, 
but are allowed for tort claims.99 Punitive damages are awarded 
infrequently - usually in response to outrageous or wanton conduct. IOO 
Moreover, they are subject to post-trial reduction. 101 Nevertheless, 
defense lawyers claim that the availability of Runitive damages has a 
"shadow effect" on litigation and settlement. 02 Clearly, no lawyer 
wants to be in the unenviable position of explaining to the client that 
the unexpected has happened: an award of significant, even financially 
ruinous, punitive damages. 103 
In Maryland, a jury may properly award punitive damages only if 
the defendant's conduct exhibits "actual malice.,,104 In other words, 
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1978) (makes punitive damages available in 
contracts cases only if the breach of contract conduct is also a tort permitting 
punitive damages.) 
100 See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights 
and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 159 (2002) ("Archival 
research examining overall patterns of awards find that punitive damages are 
infrequently awarded, moderate in size, awarded in response to outrageous 
conduct, and often reduced post-trial."); see also Stephen Daniels & Joanne 
Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1,31 (1990) 
(punitive damages awarded in 8.8 percent of all cases won by plaintiff); Brian l 
Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the i990 's, 
79 JUDICATURE 233, 238-39 (1996) (punitive damages awarded in 4 percent of 
all cases won by plaintiff). 
101 See, e.g., Bullock v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 140, reh 'g 
denied, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), remanded for 
reconsideration, 159 P.3d 33 (Cal. 2007) (reducing a twenty-eight billion dollar 
award to twenty-eight million dollars). 
102 Id. Nevertheless, some Justices of the United States Supreme Court raised 
concerns that punitive damages awards were increasing in number and amount. 
See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 
(1989) (O'Connor, l, dissenting). 
103 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979); see also Anthony l 
Franze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, instructing Juries on Punitive Damages: Due 
Process Revisted After State Farm, 6 U. PA. l CONST. L. 423 (2004); Michael 
L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages' Iron Cage, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 
1297 (2005). 
104 See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 460, 601 A.2d 633, 652 
(1992). 
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the defendant must be motivated by evil intent or the intent to do 
harm, knowing that his actions will be harmful. 105 Moreover, a 
plaintiff must prove "actual malice" by the heightened "clear and 
convincing" evidentiary standard, rather than the customary civil 
litigation standard of "preponderance of the evidence.,,106 Thus, 
Maryland permits the jury to award punitive damages only in the rare 
instance when the jury determines the defendant must be punished for 
a bad faith decision. l07 In addition to the punishment motive, punitive 
damages seek to deter potential defendants from e.ngaging in similar 
conduct. l08 By limiting such disciplinary damages, Maryland achieves 
the dual goals of punitive damages -- punishing this defendant, and 
deterring similar conduct by future bad actors. 109 
Prior to 1992, the Court of Appeals of Maryland had permitted the 
award of punitive damages for conduct demonstrating implied 
malice. llo However, current Maryland law provides that the plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant demonstrated actual malice. 11 I 
Moreover, defendants in products liability cases must have "actual 
knowledge" of a particular defect and must demonstrate deliberate or 
conscious disregard of the foreseeable harm resulting from that 
product defect. 112 In 1995, the Court of Appeals of Maryland made 
the "actual malice" requirement applicable to intentional and non-
intentional tortS. 113 Since 2004, Maryland has held that the clear and 
convincing standard applies to the burden of production as well as to 
the burden of persuasion. I 14 
B. Class Action Issues 
Some commentators have suggested that Lloyd will increase the 
potential for plaintiffs' attorneys to bring more class actions in 
105 Id. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652. 
106 Id. at 469,601 A.2d at 657. 
\07 Id. at 463,601 A.2d at 654. 
\08 Id. at 454,601 A.2d at 650. 
\09 Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 733-34, 664 A.2d 916, 932 (1995) 
(quoting Zenobia, 325 Md. at 454, 601 A.2d at 650). 
110 Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 168,297 A.2d 721, 731 (1972). 
III Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460,601 A.2d at 652. 
112 Id. at 463,601 A.2d at 654. 
113 Wilson, 339 Md. at 733, 664 A.2d at 932. 
114 Darcars Motors of Silver Spring, Inc. v. Borzym, 379 Md. 249,270,841 A.2d 
828,840-41 (2004). 
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Maryland. IIS This may be problematic in that class actions have been 
the subject of significant controversy.116 For example, Judge Richard 
Posner has charged that businesses might settle unmeritorious suits to 
avoid the possibility of high judgments, stating, "certification of a 
class action, even one lacking in merit, forces defendants 'to stake 
their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by 
fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal 
liability. ",117 Moreover, plaintiffs often recover little while their 
attorneys receive excessive fees. 118 
In response to such criticism, Congress enacted the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAF A"). 119 CAF A was intended to amend 
interstate class actions "to assure fairer outcomes for class members 
and defendants.,,12o One of the desired "fairer outcomes" was to keep 
plaintiffs' attorneys from manipulating the system. 121 In particular, 
the Senate report found "that one reason for the dramatic explosion of 
class actions in state courts is that some state court judges are less 
careful than their federal court counterparts about applying the 
procedural requirements that govern class actions.,,122 Nevertheless, 
opponents of CAF A argue that class actions provide a valuable 
deterrent for negative business practices. 123 Moreover, CAF A 
opponents view class action abuses as minor, isolated, and easily 
remedied. 124 
115 See Brian A. Zemil, Maryland Expands Products Liability for Unmanifested 
Defects, 32 LITIG. NEWS, NO.5, July 2007, at 5 (quoting John B. Isbister as 
saying, "plaintiffs' counsel may now believe that Maryland is more favorable 
for filing class actions based on unmanifested defect claims"). However, Scott 
L. Nelson argues that, "non-Maryland plaintiffs who try to file a class action in 
Maryland state court likely will end up in federal court under the Class Action 
Fairness Act, and the courts would be unlikely to apply Maryland law to claims 
by out-of-state plaintiffs against out-of-state defendants anyway." Id. 
116 See, e.g., Lesley Frieder Wolf, Evading Friendly Fire: Achieving Class 
Certification After Civil Rights Act of 1991, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1847 (2000). 
117 Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Tort Reform Past, Present 
and Future: Solving Old Problems and Dealing with "New Style" Litigation, 27 
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 237, 263 (2000) (quoting In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,1299 (7th Cir. 1995». 
118 /d. at 260; In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d at 1293, 1299. 
119 See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified 
as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 1711 et seq. (2000». 
120 Id. 
121 S. REp. No. 109-14, at 5-6 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3. 
122 See id. at 14, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 14. 
123 Cf id. at 83, as reprinted in 2005 V.S.C.C.A.N., at 76 (minority views). 
124 Id. at 83, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 76 (minority views). 
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Some su~gest that CAF A might not eliminate the current perceived 
problems. 12 For example, plaintiffs will likely limit class actions to 
state-only classes, rather than one massive national class action, 
thereby allowing state courts to retain jurisdiction. 126 Additionally, 
although in many situations bargaining power would shift to the 
defendant, plaintiffs' lawyers bringing multiple state-by-state class 
actions will retain significant power in negotiating with potential 
defendants. 127 
VI. THE COLLISION OF TORT AND CONTRACT 
As early as 1966, Marc Franklin predicted that the products liability 
system would suffer a collision between strict liability in tort and 
contractual warranty theories -- especially the implied warranty of 
merchantability.128 American legal jurisprudence continues to struggle 
with delineating the proper roles of tort and contract. 129 The economic 
loss rule is merely one aspect of this struggle. 130 Unfortunately, Lloyd 
fails to improve the situation. Rather, it adds confusion and lack of 
predictability to Maryland products liability law. 
The United States Supreme Court considered the appropriate roles 
of tort and contract in economic loss cases in East River Steamship 
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.l3l As previously discussed, the 
Court held that, "a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no 
duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to 
prevent a product from injuring itself.,,132 The Court reasoned that, 
"when a product injures only itself, the reasons for imposing a tort 
125 Anna Andreeva, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Eight-Year Saga is 
Finally Over, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 385, 386 (2005); see generally OWEN, 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 272-73 ("In a new form of class 
action litigation, courts in recent years have been asked to allow recovery for the 
reduction in value of a product because it contains a dangerous condition, such 
as a particular type of tire likely to blowout or SUV likely to roll over. The 
courts have been singularly unreceptive to these 'no-injury' claims."). 
126 Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 
80 TuL. L. REv. 1593, 1608 (2006). 
127 Cf id. 
128 Marc A. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in 
Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 974, 990-1016 (1966). 
129 See, e.g., James J. White, Reverberations from the Collision of Tort and 
Warranty, 53 s.c. L. REV. 1067 (2002). 
130 See id. at 1067-68. 
131 476 U.S. 858 (1986). 
132 Id. at 871; see also supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text. 
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duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual 
remedies are strong.,,133 Moreover, the Court emphasized the 
importance of maintaining the distinction between tort and contract. 134 
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court stressed that tort 
doctrine is concerned primarily with safety, while contract law seeks 
to protect society's interest in enforcing promises. 135 Therefore, if the 
only damage is to the product itself, societal tort concerns with safety 
are diminished. 136 Significantly, the Court stressed that, "[t]he 
increased cost to the public that would result from holding a 
manufacturer liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not 
justified.,,137 Moreover, the Court underscored that pure economic 
loss in terms of damage to the product itself is the province of 
warranty law -- the arena best-suited to protect reasonable buyer 
expectations. 138 The East River Court noted that, "maintenance of 
product value and ?uality is precisely the purpose of express and 
implied warranties." 39 Fundamentally, East River demonstrates that 
cases involving products causing economic harm by failing to meet 
reasonable buyer expectations simply deny the buyer the benefit of the 
bargain. 140 Therefore, these cases present a basic contract issue, not a 
tort concern. 141 
In East River, the United States Supreme Court recognized that 
underlying the economic loss doctrine is the contractual parties' 
freedom of contract. Specifically, parties must be permitted to allocate 
economic loss by contract. 142 Since contracting parties can set the 
terms of their agreements, the economic loss doctrine encourages the 
party best situated to assume or insure against a particular risk to 
negotiate an appropriate contract term. 143 Moreover, product sellers 
can limit their contractual liability by disclaiming warranties or 
133 E. River, 476 U.S. at 871. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 871-72. 
136 Id. at 871. 
137 Id. at 872. 
138 Id. 
139 See E. River, 476 U.S. at 872-73. 
140 Id. 
141 See id. at 873 n.8; see also Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 152 (Cal. 
1965) (holding that the doctrine of strict liability in tort governs the distinct 
problem of physical injuries and does not undermine warranty law). 
142 E. River, 476 U.S. at 872-73. 
143 See id. 
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limiting damages. 144 Underscoring the core differences between 
contract and tort, especially as applied to products liability, the Court 
stressed that, in the products arena, "where there is a duty to the public 
generally, foreseeability is an inadequate brake.,,14s Ultimately, the 
Court worried that permitting recovery for pure economic loss "could 
make a manufacturer liable for vast sumS.,,146 By contrast, the Court 
recognized that warranty law places legitimate and reasonable 
limitations on seller liability.147 At bottom, the economic loss doctrine 
is required to prevent product sellers from facing unknowable, 
unlimited damages. 
VII. PRODUCTS LIABILITY POLICY 
An underlyinr policy of products liability law is encouraging product safety.14 However, unlike "product safety" law, which is 
largely regulatory,149 products liability law operates after the fact; that 
is, after product damage has occurred, providing a private litigation 
response for product accidents. ISO Professor David Owen argues that: 
Products liability law lies at the center of the modem 
world. To a large extent, persons accomplish their 
individual and collective objectives, and relate to one 
another, through the products of technology . . . . 
Products liability law instead concerns the consequences 
of modem science and technology gone awry-when 
products, or the interactions between persons and their 
products, fail. I S I 
Professor Owen maintains that products liability has moral 
foundations at its core. IS2 These moral issues arise because the 
relationship between product seller and product accident victim 
144 Id. at 873 (citing U.C.C. §§ 2-316,2-719 (1977)). 
145 !d. at 874. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 1; see also, FRANK 1. 
VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY 20-21 (1989). 
149 Owen, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 2. 
150 !d. at 3. 
151 Id. at 6-7. 
152 Id.; see generally David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability 
Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 427, 429-30 (1993) 
(hereinafter "Owen, Moral Foundations"). 
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"implicates fundamental issues of moral philosophy.,,153 Owen asserts 
that when manufacturers make product safety decisions, they make 
choices about safety and personal autonomy, which may rightfully 
belong to product users.154 At the same time, by making risky use of 
products or making claims against product sellers, product users may 
"appropriate to themselves economic interests that may belong to 
manufacturers and other consumers.,,155 
Significantly, this approach recognizes that the product ~roducer 
and the product consumer have reciprocal safety obligations. 1 6 At the 
very least, the product accident victim must demonstrate that the 
product defect was the cause-in-fact of his harm.157 Maryland law 
generally requires the plaintiff to prove that it is more likely than not 
that the defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor" in creating the 
plaintiffs IOSS.158 Clearly, Maryland courts have been traditional in 
their view of causation in products liability law. For example, federal 
courts have recognized that Maryland courts are unlikely to innovate 
in this arena by refusing to apply market share liability to products 
liability cases. 159 They also recognize that tort liability for 
unmanifested product defects is as radical a departure from products 
liability as adoption of market share. 16o Moreover, Lloyd's rejection of 
traditional concepts of proof of product defect is equally problematic. 
Maryland products liability law has always required the plaintiff to 
prove: (1) that the product was in a defective condition when it left 
153 OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 7. 
154 Id. 
155 !d. 
156 See. e.g., Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability 
and the Demise o/the Consumer Expectations Test, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. 
REv. 227, 236 (1997); see generally David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. 
REv. 703 (1992). 
157 See e.g., Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 777, 779 (Tex. 1995) 
(Cornyn, J., concurring). 
158 Pittman V. Atl. Realty Co., 359 Md. 513, 521 n.4, 754 A.2d 1030, 1034 nA 
(2000). 
159 See McClelland V. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 735 F. Supp. 172, 174 (D. Md. 
1990) (noting that Maryland has not adopted the market share theory and 
therefore rejecting the theory because it failed to satisfy the traditional products 
liability requirement of proximate causation); see also TidIer V. Eli Lilly & Co., 
95 F.R.D. 332, 335 (D. D.C. 1982) (noting that federal judges in Maryland have 
rejected the theory and expressing doubt as to whether D.C. courts would adopt 
it). 
160 Tidier, 95 F.R.D. at 335 (calling market share a "radical departure from the 
traditional concepts of product liability law"). 
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the seller; (2) that the seller caused the defect; and (3) that the product 
defect proximately caused the plaintiffs 10SS.161 
It is all the more puzzling that the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
would abandon these basic products liability tort principles in a case, 
such as Lloyd, which provides adequate contractual and consumer 
protection remedies. 162 Simply put, there was absolutely no reason for 
the court to "innovate," by abandoning basic, established tort 
principles in a case easily solved by contract law. 163 The court, itself, 
recognized that the Lloyd plaintiffs were adequately protected by 
warranty and consumer law. 164 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland ignored the issue of moral 
responsibility. 165 Tort liability should encourage product 
manufacturers to create safer products. 166 However, these legitimate 
results are more likely to occur when product sellers ray the actual 
costs of product accident losses -- no more and no less. 1 7 Admittedly, 
the injured user must necessarily pay product accident costs that the 
seller does not pay.168 Ultimately, consumers as a whole bear the cost 
of these product accidents in the loss-spreading price increase passed 
on to them by the sellers. 169 Therefore, the market price of products 
should reflect the actual cost of those products, including accident 
costs. 170 Ignoring legitimate torts concerns of proof of defect and 
causation may, in fact, provide an inefficient and even immoral result. 
161 Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 47 Md. App. 110,121,422 A.2d 16,23 (1980); see 
also Lloyd v. Gen Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108,134,916 A.2d 257, 272 (2007) 
(citing Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958 
(1976»; see generally David A. Fischer, Products Liability -- The Meaning of 
Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339 (1974). 
162 Lloyd, 397 Md. at 157-71,916 A.2d at 285-94. 
163 Id. at 164-71, 916 A.2d at 289-94. 
164 Id. at 164-66,916 A.2d at 289-91. 
165 See generally Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 152 and accompanying 
text. 
166 See generally John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for 
Products, 44 MISS. LJ. 825, 826 (1973) ("[I]f a manufacturer knows he will be 
held liable for injuries inflicted by his product, that product will be safer."); 
David G. Owen, Musings on Modern Products Liability Law: A Foreword, 17 
SETON HALL L. REv. 505 (1987). 
167 See, Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict 
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 376 (1965). 
168 See id. at 376. 
169 Id. at 365-66. 
170 See, e.g., David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Liability, 33 VAND. 
L. REv. 681 (1980). 
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As previously discussed, most states apply the economic loss 
rule. l7l Under this rule, tort law refuses to compensate for pure 
economic or financial losses independent of any physical harm. l72 
Both the economic loss rule, and decisions recognizing the 
significance of the doctrinal distinctions between tort and contract, 
implicate important policy considerations. 173 One policy encourages 
loss spreading by placing the loss on the party best able to spread it to 
the entire consuming public through insurance or product cost 
d· 174 a ~ustments. 
Significantly, another policy favoring the economic loss rule comes 
from the law and economics literature. 175 Basically, this policy 
distinguishes between the types of tort harm. 176 The first type of harm 
results in a net social loss, where a physical harm to the plaintiff does 
not result in an economic benefit to another. I77 As the loss is not 
balanced by a similar gain, there is a net 10SS.178 Therefore, the effect 
of this tort harm is felt beyond the immediate parties. 179 Recovery in 
these cases is supported by the fundamental policy of corrective 
justice: the tortfeasor should pay the loss, not the tort victim. 180 
On the other hand, some harms are different because they simply 
shift economic activity -- one party's economic loss is another's 
171 See supra section III. 
172 See supra section III. 
173 See supra notes 37-58; see also Miller v. U.S. Steel Corp., 902 F.2d 573, 574 
(7th Cir. 1990) ("[T]ort law is a superfluous and inapt tool for resolving purely 
commercial disputes. We have a body of law designed for such disputes. It is 
called contract law. Products liability law has evolved into a specialized branch 
of tort law for use in cases in which a defective product caused, not the usual 
commercial loss, but a personal injury to a consumer or bystander."). 
174 See, e.g., Page Keeton, Products Liability -- The Nature and Extent of Strict 
Liability, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 693, 695 ("The principal reason that has now gained 
undisputed acceptance for shifting losses from users and consumers to 
manufacturers is the capacity of those engaged in the manufacturing enterprise 
to distribute the losses of the few to the many who purchase the products."). 
175 See generally Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort: 
Another Look at Robins Dry Dock v. Flint, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1991); W. 
Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort,2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982); Mario J. 
Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 
(1982). 
176 See David Gruning, Pure Economic Loss in American Tort Law: An Unstable 
Consensus, 54 AM. J. COMPo L. (SUPPLEMENT) 187,206-08 (2006). 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
180 See id. 
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economic gain. 181 As a result, the victim's harm does not result in a 
net social loss. For example, when a party's business is disrupted by 
market innovations or new competition, the party will view the 
disruption as a loss. However, the result for other ~roducers and for 
commerce is. the opposite -- they experience a gain. 18 
Misapplying the economic loss doctrine can add to the problem of 
inconsistent verdicts in the products liability arena. I83 Most scholars 
now agree that negligence and strict liability in tort, product design, 
and warning cases are basically equivalent actions. 18 Nevertheless, 
for practical reasons, plaintiffs' lawyers may prefer negligence 
claims. 185 Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that juries are more 
favorable to negligence than strict liability claims 186. The closeness of 
the two theories, however, may result in inconsistent verdicts. For 
example, if a jury decides for the plaintiff on the negligence claim, but 
for the defendant on the strict liability claim, the verdicts may be 
logically inconsistent since both claims require the product be 
"defective." As a result, the two findings -- the product is not 
defective, but the defendant was negligent in producing or selling it --
are contradictory. They cannot be reconciled or harmonized in any 
meaningful way.I87 Therefore, most courts have correctly reasoned 
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
183 The Restatement (Third) also takes the position that a plaintiff should not be 
permitted to present two "factually identical" defect claims to the jury because 
of the possibility for juror confusion, resulting in "inconsistent verdicts." 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (1998). 
184 See generally Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict 
Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 874 (2002). 
185 Paul D. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 
2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 521, 531-32 (1974). 
186 Cupp & Polage, supra note 184, at 936-37 (noting that in mock trials, twenty-
six percent of jurors hearing strict liability language awarded damages versus 
thirty-eight percent of jurors hearing negligence language; strict liability juror 
awards averaged $27,571 in pain and suffering awards versus $49,750 by 
negligence jurors). 
187 See, e.g., Halvorson v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 240 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 
1976) ("If a product is not ... defective ... it is not negligence to manufacture it 
that way."), abrogated on other grounds by Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 
N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982); Hood v. Ryobi N. Am., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 
(D. Md. 1998), afJ'd, 181 F.3d 608 n.l (4th Cir. 1999); Higginbotham v. KCS 
Int'l, Inc., 85 F. App'x. 911, 917 (4th Cir. 2005) (applying Maryland law) 
(stating that "the elements of proof are the same whether the claim be for strict 
liability or negligence" so that plaintiffs failure to establish defect and 
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that a negligence finding is inconsistent with a finding that a product is 
not defective. 188 
Similarly, the fundamental identity between the concept of 
defectiveness under strict iiability in tort,189 and unmerchantability 
under the Uniform Commercial Code,190 has also led to inconsistent 
and unsupportable verdicts. 191 Simply put, the finder of fact should 
not be permitted to conclude inconsistently that a product is not 
defective in a strict liability sense, yet breaches the implied warranty 
of merchantability.192 The majority of jurisdictions, 193 and the 
American Law Institute support this view. 194 
For similar policy reasons, the clear majority of courts have 
supported the economic loss rule, refusing to permit recovery for pure 
economic 10SS.195 These well-considered policies also explain the fact 
that the majority of courts "have been singularly unreceptive to these 
'no-injury' claims.,,196 Basically, these no-injury cases are identical to 
the Lloyd unmanifested defect claims. Maryland products liability law 
would have been better served had the Lloyd decision honored earlier 
precedent and the views of the majority of commentators and courts 
concerning the appropriate roles of tort and contract. 
VIII. CONCLUSION: A MODEST PROPOSAL 
In cases in which the defective product causes physical harm in the 
sense of damage for bodily injury or damage to other tangible 
property, tort law provides significant monetary remedies. The injured 
party can recover compensatory damages for bodily injury, pain and 
suffering, Froperty damage, and economic loss caused by the defective 
product. 19 
causation caused all their negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability 
claims to fail). 
188 See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 322-23 & n.33. 
189 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
190 V.C.c. § 2-314 (2007). 
191 OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 327; see also Denny v. 
Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730 (N.Y. 1995). 
192 See, e.g., White, supra note 129, at 1072-75. 
193 See Peter J. Ausili, Ramifications of Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 15 TOURO. L. 
REv. 735, 744 & n.49 (1998). 
194 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. n (1998); V.C.C. § 2-
314 cmt. 7 (amended 2007). 
195 See OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, supra note 23, at 273 & n.84. 
196 [d. 
197 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1977). 
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A different rule applies, however, if the product purchaser only 
suffers economic loss consisting of damage to the product itself with 
resulting financial loss, such as diminution in product value, reduced 
profits or repair costs. In the majority of jurisdictions, the product 
seller sued in tort is not liable for these pure economic damages under 
the economic loss rule. 198 
In the products liability arena, the economic loss rule has been 
subject to debate. 199 This debate focuses on the restrictive roles of tort 
and contract law?OO As previously noted, the United States Supreme 
Court views pure economic loss in the products liability arena in 
contract terms, "essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the 
benefit of its bargain - traditionally the core concern of contract 
law.,,201 
To avoid the uncertainty and inconsistency created by Lloyd, 
Maryland should adopt section 21 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability. Adoption of section 21 would clarify two areas: 1) 
adoption of the economic loss doctrine; and 2) adoption of the rule 
requiring disappointed consumers who suffer financial loss only to sue 
in contract, rather than permitting actions in both warranty and tort. 
Section 21 of the Products Liability Restatement provides for recovery 
of economic loss only "if caused by harm to: a) the plaintiffs person; 
or b) the person of another [in whom plaintiff has an interest;] or c) the 
plaintiffs property other than the defective product itself.,,202 
Adopting section 21 would place Maryland with the majority of 
jurisdictions, prohibiting recovery in tort of pure economic losses, 
independent of damage to person or other property. Just as 
significantly, it places Maryland law in the appropriate doctrinal 
position of separating contract and tort, by insisting that actual 
physical injury must occur before tort claims exist. Finally, rejecting 
claims for unmanifested defects ensures basic fairness. Providing tort 
compensation only after injury occurs ensures that the extent of the 
injury and the identity of the injured parties is more than speculative. 
198 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d & reporter's note 
cmt. d. (1998). 
199 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY ~ 27.01 (3d ed. 1994). 
200 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmt. d 
(Proposed Final Draft No.1, 2005). 
201 E. River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870 
(1986); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d 
(1998). 
202 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 (1998). 
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Although the Lloyd approach would be rejected, the A.J Decoster Co. 
case, permitting recovery in tort for damage to property other than the 
product itself, could be retained.203 At the same time, adoption of 
section 21 would place Maryland with the majority of courts, as well 
as the V.C.C., which include repair and replacement costs under 
contract law.204 It would return Maryland to the path first taken in 
PhippS205 - the path which respects the appropriate differences between 
contract and tort, the path which best serves Maryland products 
liability law development. 
203 A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 333 Md. 245, 259, 634 A.2d 
1330, 1337 (1994). 
204 See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 21 crnt. d (1998). 
205 See Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976). 
